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Abstract
As America awakened to a greater antislavery consciousness, Asa 
Mahan, president of  the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, presented his seminal 
reflection	 on	 Christian	 Perfection.	 Mahan	 offered	 an	 unusually	 precise	
definition	of 	perfection	or	holiness.	The	Oberlin	president	borrowed	from	
Scottish Common Sense Realism to suggest an understanding of  Christian 
Perfection that was both personally rigorous and socially prophetic. This 
conception of  holiness was also rooted in a commitment to objective truth.
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Introduction
 In her riveting narrative of  Ohio’s Underground Railroad, Ann 
Hagedorn writes:
    
  Eighteen hundred and thirty-eight was the year of  the great 
escape of  the Maryland slave Frederick Augustus Bailey, who, 
dressed	 as	 a	 sailor	 back	 from	duty	 at	 sea,	 fled	on	 a	 train	 to	
New York, where he changed his surname to Douglass after a 
character in the poem The Lady of  the Lake by Sir Walter Scott. 
It was the year when Pennsylvania Hall, a large new building 
in Philadelphia erected for the cause of  free speech, including 
abolitionism, opened with an assemblage of  thousands, 
including William Lloyd Garrison – and closed four days later, 
after a mob burned it to the ground. And it was the year when 
the government forced the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, 
and Seminole to march a thousand miles along a “trail of  
tears” out of  their indigenous Southeastern U.S. to land west 
of  the Mississippi (Hagedorn 2002: 140).
Eighteen hundred and thirty-eight was also the year that Asa 
Mahan, antislavery president of  the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, presented 
a seminal paper on Christian Perfection. During the evening of  September 
4, 1838, Mahan addressed the Oberlin “Society of  Inquiry” regarding 
the question, “Is Perfection in Holiness Attainable in this Life?” (Mahan 
1838:1).  From that point forward, Oberlin’s commitment to human rights 
became inextricable from its promotion of  a unique holiness theology. 
This integrated conviction went far beyond an application of  perfectionist 
ideas to social problems. Mahan articulated a very precise view of  Christian 
holiness.	His	definition	of 	 spiritual	maturity	demanded	an	unconditional	
regard for the intrinsic worth of  God and people. 
The Case for Egalitarian Realism
 Asa Mahan was born on November 9, 1799 in Vernon, New York 
and thus came of  age among a religious populace warmed and worn out by 
revival	fires.	His	upbringing	matched	the	intensity	of 	New	York’s	“Burned	
Over	District,”	and	he	was	graduated	first	from	Hamilton	College	and	then	
Andover Seminary. In 1831 Mahan accepted the pastorate of  Cincinnati’s 
Sixth Presbyterian Church and also took on duties as a trustee of  Lane 
Theological Seminary. His staunch support for the student antislavery 
movement at Lane brought both condemnation and opportunity (Madden 
and Hamilton 1982: 26-51).  Mahan and many of  the Lane abolitionists 
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eventually moved to Oberlin, Ohio. Here Mahan served as president of  the 
Oberlin Collegiate Institute from 1835-1850.
 Asa Mahan did not take up presidential duties without 
philosophical predisposition. He is best known for uniting a theology of  
Christian Perfection with uncompromising social principles. However he 
developed this witness against the backdrop of  clear metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments. From beginning to end Mahan was a realist 
of  the Scottish variety. His two-volume work, A Critical History of  Philosophy 
(1883), sorted all cognitive traditions into four basic schools: idealism, 
materialism, skepticism, and realism. Mahan claimed that idealism reduces 
external realities to subjective operations of  the mind, and materialism 
subordinates	reflection	to	external	objects.	Skepticism	denies	knowledge	in	
either subjective or objective form. Only realism, according to Asa Mahan, 
offers a perspective that honors both the subject and object in relations of  
understanding (Momany 2005: 75-84 and Momany 2009: 142-153). 
 The Scottish philosophy of  Common Sense was a form of  realism 
codified	 and	 then	 popularized	 by	 Thomas	 Reid	 (1710-1796),	 Dugald	
Stewart (1753-1828), and others. Most identify its establishment in America 
with the college presidency of  John Witherspoon at Princeton (1768-
1794). This perspective claimed for humanity an innate ability to know 
the world as it really exists. Moreover, realists of  the Scottish school held 
that every human being enjoyed the intellectual capacity to conceptualize 
both the self  and others with remarkable accuracy. Realism was, at once, a 
straightforward and demonstrably egalitarian viewpoint. It also developed 
a	regional	flavor.	Idealism	held	strong	appeal	in	New	England.	Materialism	
radiated from Philadelphia to points south. Realism was a quintessentially 
middle-American philosophy, given distinctive stamp in New Jersey and 
then sent west. 
 Asa Mahan’s commitment to Scottish Common Sense was typical 
and is easily overlooked. This form of  realism pervaded the frontier 
expansion of  antebellum higher education, so much so that it received 
the scorn of  more imaginative critics. By the twentieth century, Common 
Sense was judged a superannuated construct possessing little vigor. 
Even more generous appraisals described it as an artifact of  increasingly 
irrelevant religious traditions. I. Woodbridge Riley’s landmark study of  
American philosophy (1907) considered the role of  realism in collegiate 
life and concluded that it was “an eminently safe philosophy which kept 
undergraduates locked in so many intellectual dormitories, safe from the 
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dark speculations of  materialism or the beguiling allurements of  idealism” 
(Riley: 477).  A nation come of  age during the late nineteenth century could 
not help its urbane desire to cast off  shopworn epistemological habits. The 
Scottish philosophy fell into disrepute. 
	 As	 the	 twentieth	 century	 dawned	 more	 refined	 intellectuals	
continued to distance themselves from Scottish Realism. Not until 
Sydney Ahlstrom’s 1955 article, “The Scottish Philosophy and American 
Theology,” did a more charitable evaluation appear (Ahlstrom: 257-272). 
Ahlstrom was no promoter of  naïve realism. Rather, hindsight brought a 
less disdainful treatment of  the movement.
Meanwhile, Common Sense Realism remained a force in certain 
church circles, especially those attracted to fundamentalism. Mainline and 
secular academics could appreciate Scottish thought by the 1950s, primarily 
because they had not defended its assumptions for decades. Evangelical 
scholars faced a unique challenge. Among conservative Protestants, the 
assertions of  Common Sense were alive, if  not exactly well, long into 
the twentieth century. George Marsden and Mark Noll have charted the 
tradition’s trajectory among Evangelicalism from the Civil War to World 
War II (especially Marsden 1980 and Noll 1985: 216-238).  Yet they and 
others have never really made up their minds whether Common Sense 
proclivities deserve a residual courtesy or outright censure. By the late 
twentieth century, self-conscious Evangelicals considered Scottish Realism 
an intellectual embarrassment. However, this belated criticism invites its 
own critique, especially since the dominant historiography has come from 
Reformed church historians (Noll 1994: 83-107).       
 Even before most Protestant conservatives declared independence 
from their cumbersome legacy, others were prepared to consider realism 
anew. The publication of  a two-volume work, A History of  Philosophy in 
America, by Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphey (1977) introduced 
an authentic appreciation for Scottish Common Sense. Flower and 
Murphey acknowledged that the philosophy had long been dismissed, but 
they wielded their impeccable Ivy League credentials (the University of  
Pennsylvania) to register a series of  “character witnesses” for realism (1997, 
vol. 1: 203). As with the earlier analysis of  Ahlstrom, Flower and Murphey 
did not endorse simplistic theories of  knowledge, but they did commend 
the tradition’s more admirable qualities. 
Recent scholarship has noted ways in which Common Sense was 
employed by the dispossessed and marginalized. Maurice Lee’s fascinating 
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study of  nineteenth-century American literature and its philosophical 
grounding is one example. Lee compares two of  the autobiographies 
written by Frederick Douglass in 1845 and in 1855. He demonstrates how 
the	latter	version	incorporates	specific	themes	from	the	Scottish	school	that	
are	lacking	in	the	first	book	(Lee	2005:	93-132).	The	second	autobiography,	
My Bondage and My Freedom, contains analysis similar to that of  Douglass’s 
colleague, James McCune Smith – a Scottish-educated physician of  African 
descent. Smith even wrote the preface to this second autobiography.
By 1855 Douglass insisted upon speaking for himself, not only 
about his experience but most especially about the meaning of  his experience. 
Invoking and then deploying peculiarly Scottish notions regarding the mind, 
Douglass was no longer content to narrate his victimization. He became the 
proprietor	of 	his	reflection.	He	claimed	the	power	of 	his	consciousness.	
When white New England abolitionists asked Douglass to present the 
“facts” of  slavery so that they could give it a philosophical critique, he 
confronted them (Douglass 1994: 367). Douglass eventually moved from 
the	controlling,	New	England	influence	of 	William	Lloyd	Garrison	and	to	
the more independent (and western) environment of  Rochester, New York. 
The	realism	of 	Frederick	Douglass	affirmed	his	intellectual	powers;	that	of 	
Asa Mahan embraced those excluded by more fashionable philosophies.
Faculty Psychology and the Law of  Love
 Key to understanding the Scottish tradition is its assertion that all 
people share a universal human nature. The claim that this nature provided 
all with direct access to reality might be lampooned by more sophisticated 
critics, but the implications regarding equality and human rights were 
compelling. This latter point was not lost on Asa Mahan.
 In 1846 Mahan released a most intriguing, eclectic, and evocative 
article. Writing for The Oberlin Quarterly Review he gave his piece the rather 
nondescript title: “Certain Fundamental Principles, together with their 
Applications.”	 This	 article	 was	 really	 a	 manifesto	 of 	 first	 principles	 for	
human rights advocacy, as conceived by the Oberlin president. Front and 
center stood the statement that all rights and interests of  humanity “rest 
exclusively upon the permanent and changeless laws of  human nature 
itself, upon the elements of  humanity common to all individuals of  the 
race” (Mahan 1846: 228). Further on he concluded that this shared identity 
is so seminal, any acceptance of  its violation in a single person degrades our 
own dignity (Mahan 1846: 229-230).
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 So just what was the Common Sense anthropology? For this 
realists turned to the sub-discipline of  Mental Philosophy. Accordingly, 
humans were posited as beings of  three distinct faculties: the Intellect 
(or Intelligence), the Sensibility, and the Will (see especially Meyer 1972). 
Variations on this triad abounded in antebellum America, and moral 
philosophers were especially adept at bending these categories to advance 
their respective theories. Asa Mahan made explicit late in life the viewpoint 
he carried very early. His 1882 text, The System of  Mental Philosophy, reiterates 
a more-or-less typical faculty psychology. Yet one curious fact remains. 
Mahan is remembered for an emphasis upon volition. His Mental Philosophy 
devotes 185 pages to the Intellect, 74 to the Sensibility, and a mere 13 to the 
Will (Mahan 1882).
	 This	imbalance	is	more	than	rectified	by	an	earlier	book	devoted	
exclusively to the Will. His 1845 Doctrine of  the Will is often cited as a classic 
refutation of  the determinism bequeathed by Jonathan Edwards, and some 
have concluded that the book trumpets a “decisionistic” ethic (Maddox 
1995/1996: 160 and Maddox 1998: 46-47).  Regardless, careful readers will 
detect an impressively subtle and supple faculty psychology.
 Mahan granted that the Intellect and the Sensibility are dominated 
by involuntary characteristics. We know that which we know and feel that 
which we feel. However, the realm of  action has a quality all its own. We 
are not destined to act in the same way that we know or feel things (Mahan 
1845: 124-129). Mahan’s explication of  this peculiar freedom is open to 
debate. Traditional Wesleyans might wonder whether he leans more toward 
a natural ability than a gracious ability, but it is not quite fair to accuse him 
of  teaching a bootstrap theology. Additionally, if  Mahan appears at times to 
suspect the affective side of  things, we might withhold our judgment until 
hearing him out.
 The eleventh chapter of  the Doctrine of  the Will is crucial. Here 
Mahan addresses the relationship between the Intellect, the Sensibility, 
and the Will when action is deemed morally right and when it is deemed 
morally wrong. His remarks are revealing: “In all acts and states morally 
right, the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral 
obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the impulses of  
the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all acts morally wrong, 
the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, irrespective of  the dictates of  the 
Intelligence” (Mahan 1845: 156). This statement may lead one to conclude 
that Mahan was suspicious of  all feeling, that he was some kind of  rigid 
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formalist when it came to ethics. Yet the real focus of  these remarks is the 
Intelligence. Consistent with his Common Sense tradition, Mahan trusted 
humanity’s ability to know the world outside, its character, and especially its 
value. In fact, his reliance on the Intellect, as opposed to the Sensibility, was 
actually Mahan’s way of  avoiding self-absorption. His brand of  realism was 
not	so	much	an	overconfident	theory	of 	knowledge	as	it	was	a	reminder	
that we have obligations to those around us, even when we do not feel such 
commitment.
	 This	other-directedness	is	given	more	specific	articulation	when	
Mahan moves into a discussion of  the moral law. Like most he reiterates 
the teaching of  Jesus regarding love of  God and neighbor. However Mahan 
also attempts to place this instruction in philosophical context. He pushed 
himself 	to	develop	a	specifically	metaphysical,	even	ontological,	principle	
that captures the essence of  love. His expression may not be elegant, but 
it is comprehensive: “It shall be the serious intention of  all moral agents 
to esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their 
perceived intrinsic and relative importance, and out of  respect for their 
intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of  duty, or moral obligation” 
(Mahan 1845: 163). The notion of  an intrinsic worth, outside of  the self, is 
the fulcrum around which Mahan’s entire ethic turns.
Because God and human beings are of  inestimable worth, they 
command our primary regard. In 1840, Mahan wrote: “If  the question be 
asked, why ought God to be the object of  supreme regard? the answer, and 
the only answer is: His intrinsic excellence is greater than any or all other 
objects. If  it be asked: why ought we to love our neighbor as ourselves, the 
only answer that can be given is this: his [or her] interest is of  the same 
intrinsic value as ours” (Mahan 1840: 208). Mahan considered this axiology 
an objective truth. 
 The Oberlin president’s 1848 Science of  Moral Philosophy	 clarifies	
the role of  the Intelligence in perceiving intrinsic worth. Here he discusses 
“subjective servitude” or the captivity to feelings. In contrast, Mahan argues 
that people are free when they act toward objects according to “their intrinsic 
and relative importance, as apprehended by the intelligence” (Mahan 1848: 
307). If  subjective servitude entails being driven by the Sensibility, then an 
affirmation	of 	intrinsic	worth,	as	known	by	the	Intelligence,	promises	true	
liberty.
 Mahan’s faculty psychology provided much more than a 
variegated theory of  action. It grounded his entire pedagogy. The free and 
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educated person was characterized by an ordered Intelligence, Sensibility, 
and Will. Mahan gave intricate expression to this view when he said: 
     The great want of  universal humanity is a knowledge of  
truth, and a state of  feeling and action in harmony with truth 
manifested to the mind. To this great end all the mental powers 
are,	 as	 designed	 by	 the	 Creator,	 in	 fixed	 correlation.	 The	
intellect is adapted to one result – the discovery and retention 
of  truth, and its presentation to the heart. The exclusive sphere 
of  the Will is perpetual action in harmony with truth known, 
and the continued employment of  the intelligence in the 
discovery of  the unknown; while the equally exclusive sphere 
of  the Sensibility is to delight in the former, and through the 
influence	of 	desire	to	impel	the	Will	in	directing	the	Intellect	
in search of  the latter. The true idea of  education is mental 
development	 in	 fixed	 correlation	 to	 this	 great	 end	 (Mahan	
1846: 234-235).
This text invites several observations. Perhaps most important is its holistic 
character. To consider these words is to ponder an integrated, even symbiotic 
type of  faculty psychology. For instance, the Sensibility seems to receive 
greater recognition here. Was the college educator simply inconsistent? No. 
He appreciated the affective more than most contemporary commentators 
grant, but the delight involved was a joy in the presence of  truth. Always 
the	 realist,	Mahan	began	and	ended	his	 reflection	with	 a	 respect	 for	 the	
value of  things as they are.
Holiness as Delight in Truth 
 It is perhaps ironic that Mahan titled his groundbreaking 1838 
essay, “Is Perfection in Holiness Attainable in this Life?” Much of  the 
ensuing Holiness Movement would be preoccupied with this question. It 
can be argued that more energy has been expended debating the attainability 
of 	Christian	perfection	than	defining	what	is	meant	by	Christian	perfection.	
The latter issue was exceedingly important to Asa Mahan.
 The best known expression of  Mahan’s holiness teaching is 
his 1839 Scripture Doctrine of  Christian Perfection. The book begins with a 
chapter	on	the	“nature”	of 	Christian	perfection.	Mahan	links	his	definition	
of  holiness to a healthy interaction of  the mental faculties. Within the 
sanctified	person,	 the	 intellectual	powers	will	seek	“the	truth	and	will	of 	
God, and by what means we may best meet the demands of  the great law 
of  love” (Mahan 1839: 14). Likewise, the feelings and susceptibilities will 
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be “in perfect and perpetual harmony with the truth and will of  God as 
apprehended by the intellect” (Mahan 1839: 15). Mahan employed a faculty 
psychology in his very early articulations of  holiness theology.
 An even more detailed explication of  the role faculty psychology 
played in Asa Mahan’s holiness teaching can be found among his handwritten, 
manuscript notebook. After various lecture outlines, sermon ideas, and 
philosophical	musings,	Mahan	explored	the	topic	of 	“Sanctification”	with	
reference to the mental faculties. Underscoring these notes is a connection 
between the conception of  Christian perfection and that of  “truth.” Mahan 
referenced John 17:17, as translated by the KJV: “Sanctify them through thy 
truth” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings, Miscellaneous”). Whether Mahan’s 
interpretation of  “truth” is the same thing intended by the writer of  the 
Fourth Gospel can be argued. Yet truth, in some expression, anchored the 
Oberlin	president’s	approach	to	holiness,	just	as	it	figured	prominently	in	
his faculty psychology.
 A considerable part of  Mahan’s emphasis on truth can be 
traced to his belief  in a knowable, objective reality. These same notes 
on	sanctification	stress	that	the	holy	person	is	one	whose	intention	“will	
be in perfect harmony with the nature, character, and relations of  all 
objects apprehended by the intelligence” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings, 
Miscellaneous”). Moreover, one’s “feelings will correspond with the nature 
of  the objects presented” (Mahan, “Manuscript Writings, Miscellaneous”). 
The interaction between Asa Mahan’s faculty psychology and his theology 
of  holiness is so complete that it is virtually impossible to extricate one 
from the other.
 While some might question the role played by the Sensibility in 
Mahan’s	holiness	teaching,	others	may	find	his	focus	on	the	world	outside	
refreshing. There is nothing in Mahan’s witness that deprecates “heart” 
holiness, but there is plenty to keep us from turning the tradition into 
incessant navel-gazing. This might be Asa Mahan’s most powerful and 
enduring contribution. It might also be an incisive gift for today’s church.
 Popular religious language these days is all about “passion” – 
how	to	find	your	passion,	how	to	live	your	passion,	how	to	maintain	your	
passion. Not surprisingly, this terminology differs little from that celebrated 
in the rest of  American culture. We might note that one university with a 
reputation for releasing annual lists of  overused and clichéd terms opened 
2013 with a ban on the word: “passion” (Patterson 2012). Such self-anointed 
policing of  the language could be nothing further than hype and bombast 
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generated by the culture it seeks to correct, but there may be something to 
the indictment.
 I work with young adults as a college chaplain and as a 
professor. My scholarship needs to intersect with the deepest yearnings 
of  undergraduates. My student friends might seem to want outlets for 
their	constructive	passion,	and	 to	a	significant	degree,	 they	do.	However	
I have been astounded by the ways in which they want more than 
passion. They want truth – truth in all of  its forms. They want something 
substantial enough to sustain them when their short-lived desire fails. 
They want something eternal and beautiful that can orient their delight 
and joy. They want holiness that will leave them with more than a warm 
feeling. They want a holiness that will point them toward God and other 
people. Here is where Asa Mahan’s theology has much to offer us today. 
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